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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






SOLOMON SHIFFERAW GEBRU, 





 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
              Respondent  
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA A208-898-930) 
Immigration Judge: John Ellington 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 7, 2021 
 
Before:   AMBRO, JORDAN, BIBAS, Circuit Judges. 
 







* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Solomon Gebru seeks review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) affirming the denial of his application for asylum.1  We will deny the petition. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Gebru is a forty-seven-year-old citizen of Ethiopia.  He left Ethiopia in 2005 for 
South Africa, where he lived for ten years.2  He arrived in the United States in 2016, 
wanting political asylum.  Officials with the Department of Homeland Security served 
him with a notice to appear in immigration court for lacking a valid entry document.   
 Gebru appeared before an immigration judge (“IJ”) in York, Pennsylvania and 
formally requested asylum.  He testified that he “was subjected to … beatings by the 
security forces” in Ethiopia “[b]ecause of [his] involvement in politics[.]”  (A.R. at 619.)  
More specifically, he said that on June 8, 2005, he participated in demonstrations against 
the government’s alleged cancellation of the results of a recent election.  By his account, 
a party called the Coalition for Unity and Democracy won the election and, as a supporter 
of that political group, he joined the demonstrations “to demand that the government 
accept[ ] the result of the election[.]”  (A.R. at 621.)  He carried a sign and chanted 
slogans.  Government security forces arrived to disperse the crowd by force, shooting and 
beating protestors.  e witnessed the security forces shoot someone.  Gebru “was beaten on 
 
1 The BIA’s decision also affirmed the denial of his applications for withholding 
of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but Gebru does not 
challenge those holdings on appeal 
 
2 Gebru allegedly left South Africa because he was denied asylum protections, in 
addition to the country’s increasing crime rates and the looting of his electronics store.   
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his arms, legs, and back[,]” and he had bruises as a result of the beatings.  (A.R. at 13.)  
The next day, he went to a clinic where he was prescribed antibiotics and pain medication 
for “soft tissue injury to bilateral arms and legs[,] multiple bruises and swelling on r[igh]t 
and l[ef]t arms[,] skin abrasion[,] and bruises on r[igh]t and l[ef]t leg[s.]”  (A.R. at 841.)  
Gebru claims that, several days after the demonstration, he received a paper telling him to 
report to a police station, but that he no longer has a copy of that document.   
 Gebru’s sister, Hermanmine Gebru, also testified as a witness at the initial merits 
hearing, stating that Gebru came home from the June 8, 2005 demonstration with bruises.  
She said that police came to their home two days later looking for Gebru, but that he was 
not home at the time.  She also explained that Gebru was involved in the Coalition for 
Unity and Democracy while he was in Ethiopia, though she did not know if he remained 
involved after the 2005 demonstration or with what other political groups he might be 
involved.   
  Initially, the IJ denied Gebru’s application for asylum but granted his application 
for withholding of removal.  On appeal, the BIA remanded for further fact finding and 
legal analysis.  The IJ consequently conducted a second merits hearing.  In his second 
opinion, the IJ denied Gebru’s application for asylum as a matter of discretion even 
though he found that Gebru had established past persecution based on political opinion.  
The IJ again granted his application for withholding of removal.  The BIA, on appeal, 
held that the “minor injury sustained by” Gebru did not rise to the level of past 
persecution.  (A.R. at 172-73.)  On remand, the IJ held a third merits hearing, in which 
the parties produced only documentary evidence and no additional testimony.  Gebru 
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introduced evidence allegedly demonstrating his continued involvement in various 
political groups.  He also produced an affidavit from his father, who said that he, Gebru’s 
father, was detained by Ethiopian security forces for two days in 2018 and interrogated 
about the continued involvement of Gebru in opposition political groups.   
 In his third and final opinion dated October 4, 2018, the IJ considered whether 
Gebru “has shown a well-founded fear of persecution for asylum in the absence of past 
persecution.”  (A.R. at 55.)  The IJ concluded that Gebru failed to meet his burden “that 
he has an objectively reasonable well-founded fear of future persecution[.]”  (A.R. at 60.)   
The IJ also denied his application for withholding of removal.  Gebru appealed that 
decision to the BIA, which dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the IJ.  The 
BIA afforded diminished weight to Gebru’s father’s letter, as it was unnotarized and from 
an interested party.   
 This petition for review followed. 
II. DISCUSSION3 
 Gebru argues that the BIA erred in affirming the denial of his application for 
asylum.  To establish eligibility for asylum, he “must show that he is a ‘refugee’ within 
 
3 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Where, as here, “the BIA affirms the IJ’s determinations … and 
only adds its own gloss to the analysis,” we review both levels of the agency’s decision 
making.  Doe v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).  “While 
we review for substantial evidence the [IJ’s] factual findings, we review [its] legal 
determinations de novo, including both pure questions of law and applications of law to 
undisputed facts.”  Blanco v. Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (second 
alteration in original) (citation omitted).  Substantial evidence is an “extraordinarily 
deferential standard” under which we uphold factual findings “if they are ‘supported by 
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’”  
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the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”  Blanco v. Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 
304, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A)).  To do so, he 
must demonstrate that he “is ‘unable or unwilling to return to’ his home country because 
of past persecution or, in the alternative, a well-founded fear of future persecution, on 
account of a protected ground— ‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.’”  Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).  Persecution 
includes “threats to life, confinement, [and] torture[.]”  Id. at 311 (quoting Lukwago v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2003)).  “[I]solated incidents that do not result in 
serious injury do not rise to the level of persecution.”  Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 
615 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).  To prove past persecution, Gebru has to show that 
the Ethiopian government “either committed the persecution or was unable or unwilling 
to control the persecutor.”  Blanco, 967 F.3d at 310 (citation omitted).  If he shows that 
he suffered past persecution, a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution is triggered.  Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 174.  Even if Gebru fails to demonstrate 
past persecution, however, he may still qualify for asylum based on a well-founded fear 
of future persecution if he returns to Ethiopia.  Id. 
 Gebru argues that he demonstrated past persecution through his testimony that he 
was beaten by government security forces at the June 8, 2005 demonstration.  The record, 
though, supports a contrary conclusion.  Though physically painful and no doubt deeply 
distressing, a single beating resulting in bruising is not enough to rise to the level of past 
 
Romero v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 
665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
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persecution.  See Voci, 409 F.3d at 615.  Unlike the petitioner in Voci, who faced 
“multiple beatings from police,” “result[ing] in a hospital stay of approximately three 
months[,]” id. at 614-15, Gebru had injuries far less severe, and he did not seek medical 
attention until the next day.  (A.R. at 841.)  While it is true that serious injury need not 
mean “serious physical injury[,]” Gebru’s argument that he suffered psychological 
trauma from witnessing the police shoot another protester was effectively rejected by the 
BIA and substantial evidence sustains that ruling.  Blanco, 967 F.3d at 311.  Gebru 
provided no proof of psychological harm before the IJ or BIA.  The same is true of his 
contention that the police summons he allegedly received meant he would be subjected to 
more physical abuse.   
 Gebru also contends that he established a reasonable fear of future persecution in 
Ethiopia based on his political opinion.  He first takes issue with the IJ affording 
diminished weight to his father’s letter.  Regarding that letter, the BIA limited its ruling 
to the IJ’s reasoning that the letter was unnotarized and from an interested party.4  That 
conclusion relates to whether the letter satisfied “standards of reliability and 
trustworthiness.”  Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 2003).  Because the 
letter was unnotarized, uncorroborated, and from an interested family member not subject 
 
4 While Gebru is correct, and the government agrees, that notarization is not 
required, it can serve to bolster a letter’s reliability.   
7 
 
to cross examination, the IJ and BIA were within the bounds of appropriate discretion in 
affording the letter diminished weight. 
 Even accepting Gebru’s father’s letter at face value, however, substantial evidence 
supports the finding that Gebru’s fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable.  
The letter does not claim that government officials threatened Gebru himself.  See Long 
Hao Li v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “a letter from [the 
petitioner’s] mother that indicated that the Chinese authorities sought to arrest him” did 
not compel a finding of a clear probability of persecution).  In addition, Gebru’s 
testimony establishes one violent incident at the hands of the Ethiopian government over 
fifteen years ago, and the evidence does not suggest that his participation in political 
groups disfavored by the Ethiopian government rises above minimal, low-level 
involvement.  Gebru’s political involvement does not appear to be significant enough to 
continue to draw the Ethiopian government’s attention to him.5  Thus, substantial 
evidence supports the IJ’s finding, affirmed by the BIA, that Gebru does not have a well-
founded fear of future persecution.6 
 Because Gebru failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution, he has not met his burden to prove that he is eligible for asylum.  
 
5 It is for that reason that Gebru’s citation to Myat Thu v. Att’y Gen., 510 F.3d 405 
(3d Cir. 2007), is inapposite.  Unlike Gebru’s evidence, the petitioner in Myat Thu 
introduced two letters explaining that “he was heavily involved in political activities 
disapproved by the Burmese government, and which, if accepted as truthful, show he is 
indeed likely to be someone of whom the Burmese authorities are aware.”  Id. at 415 
(emphasis added). 
 




For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
“excessive force and arbitrary arrest in response to the protests, politically motivated 
prosecutions, and continued restrictions on activities of civil society and NGOs.”  (A.R. 
at 446.)  That information may help corroborate Gebru’s assertion that he was beaten at 
the June 8, 2005 protest, but does not meaningfully strengthen his argument that he has 
an objectively reasonable fear of future prosecution if he returns to Ethiopia now. 
